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SILENCE IS GOLDEN: THE LACK OF DIRECTION ON COMPENSATION FOR 
EXPROPRIATION IN THE 2011 GREEN PAPER ON LAND REFORM 
 
E du Plessis 
 
1 Introduction 
 
When I started my doctorate in 2005, the then Minister of Land Affairs, Lulu 
Xingwana, had just caused an uproar by remarking that land reform will be speeded 
up by shortening the negotiation period for compensation for individual 
expropriations.1 Farmers, concerned that South Africa would become the next 
Zimbabwe,2 objected that Xingwana's statements were in conflict with land reform 
laws setting out the procedures to be followed for expropriation. They insisted on a 
reasonable commercial price for farming properties. The ministry, on the other hand, 
was of the opinion that farmers were making expropriation difficult by inflating 
property prices,3 thereby preventing the government from successfully returning 
property to people who lost it under "years of racial discrimination and white colonial 
rule".4 The government therefore proposed to move away from the willing-buyer-
willing-seller model5, intimating its intention to move away from buying property 
from farmers through negotiations, and using expropriation as a legitimate 
alternative method of land acquisition instead. This resulted in fierce media debates 
and reports of tension between mostly white farmers and the government.6 The 
farmers persistently relied on the concept of "compensation" as contained in and 
                                        
  Elmien (WJ) du Plessis. Senior Lecturer, University of Johannesburg, Law Faculty. 
elmiendp@uj.ac.za. I would like to thank the organisers of the conference: Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation / NWU on the Green Paper on Land Reform: Challenges and Opportunities held on 
27 July 2012 in Johannesburg for providing me with an opportunity to present my paper. 
1  SAPA 2006 mg.co.za. 
2  Swartz 2006 www.news24.com. 
3  SAPA 2006 mg.co.za; Wanneburg 2006 www.iol.co.za. 
4  Swartz 2006 www.news24.com. 
5  In cl 5(a) of the Green Paper on Land Reform (2011) also referred to as "[t]he land acquisition 
strategy". 
6  This is evident in many newspaper reports. See for instance Sinkins Witness 5; West Business 
Day 2. 
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historically construed under the Expropriation Act,7 should they be expropriated. For 
the farmers it is important to receive the full market value of property that has been 
expropriated. That is how it used to be prior to 1994. A Constitution8 protecting 
existing property rights, but not guaranteeing full market-value compensation for 
expropriation, is in their view insufficient and may pose a threat to their vested 
interests.9 This indicates a perception that when land is bought, prices can be 
negotiated and the farmer is likely to receive full market value for the property, 
while when the property is expropriated, the Constitution causes uncertainty and 
poses the risk of compensation below market value. The farmers' fears stand in 
tension with the government's land reform aspirations. The government, pressed by 
the constitutional mandate to transform, seeks to rely to an increasing extent on the 
new compensation possibilities created by the Constitution and entailing possible 
departure from strict market value compensation in all instances.10 
 
Seven years down the line the issue is still not settled. The Expropriation Bill11 was 
shelved in 2009,12 a draft Green Paper leaked in 2010, an official Green Paper 
published in 201113 and a Land Reform Policy document of the African National 
Congress (ANC) produced in 2012,14 while a Draft Expropriation Bill made its 
appearance in March 2013.15 Recently Stone Sizane, as chairperson of Parliament's 
land reform committee, stated that government is not making sufficient use of its 
right to expropriate land.16 Despite South Africa having a land market and the 
necessary infrastructure to facilitate transfer of land, the government has so far 
been unable to affect land reform through the voluntary acquisition of land.17 In 
                                        
7  Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
8  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9  Naidu Sunday Independent 1. Schoeman Farmers Weekly 22. 
10  To date the government mostly acquired land for land reform purposes by buying the land from 
the owner, the price being determined by agreement. It seems as if the government, when 
saying that it wants to depart from the "willing-buyer-willing-seller" model, means that it would 
henceforth expropriate land as opposed to entering into negotiations with the owner. 
11  Expropriation Bill B16-2008. 
12  For notes on this, see Du Plessis 2011 Stell LR 352-375. 
13  Agri SA 2011 www.agrisa.co.za. 
14  ANC 2012 www.anc.org.za. 
15  Draft Expropriation Bill, 2013 (GN 234 in GG 36269 of 20 March 2013). 
16  SAPA 2012 www.news24.com. 
17  Greenberg Date Unknown www.amandlapublishers.co.za. 
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many instances it is bureaucratic obstacles that prevented this, but there are also 
instances where the land offered for sale was not suitable for the purpose it was 
acquired for, and in some instances the current owners demanded excessive prices 
for land.18 With many landowners politically sceptical or opposed to land reform and 
with some loosing their faith in the process because of bureaucratic delays from the 
government, land reform has reached a stalemate. A possible solution lies in the 
state making better use of its expropriation powers by expropriating property for 
land reform purposes.19 Upon such expropriation, compensation must be paid. 
 
Does the 2011 Green Paper on Land Reform provide any guidance on the issue of 
compensation for expropriation? The aim of this paper is to show the potential and 
the shortcomings of the Green Paper with regard to compensation for expropriation 
in the land reform context. To do so it will start by clarifying the concept of "willing-
buyer-willing-seller". Thereafter, the paper will discuss the Green Paper's stance on 
the issue. A discussion of compensation for expropriation under the Constitution20 
will follow, discussing the constitutional mandate to expropriate for land reform 
purposes, as well as the way compensation should be calculated under the 
Constitution. Lastly, it will conclude with an evaluation of the Green Paper on the 
issue of compensation for expropriation. 
 
2 Terminology 
 
The willing-buyer-willing-seller model stands opposed to expropriation as a way of 
acquiring land for land reform purposes. This is based on the pro-market approach 
the government adopted in 1994 on advice from the World Bank.21 In terms of this 
approach, land is transferred by contract. It effectively leaves landowners with the 
discretion of whether they want to partake in land reform or not.22 
                                        
18  Manjengwa 2006 www.plaas.org.za. 
19  This seems to be the opinion of the Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform, 23 May 
2012 (Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 www.pmg.org.za). 
20  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
21  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1577. 
22  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1585. 
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The 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy23 supported the willing-buyer-
willing-seller model. This was despite section 25 of the Constitution that provides for 
expropriation of land for land reform purposes and for compensation below market 
prices.24 One can only attribute this to the neoliberal and investor friendly economic 
strategy adopted by the ANC at the start of the constitutional democracy.25 
 
This approach should be distinguished from the willing-buyer-willing-seller model 
that is used to calculate market value compensation when expropriating property 
based on section 1226 of the Expropriation Act.27 All this is done to determine what 
price the property will fetch in the open market on the date of the notice. The value 
that property will fetch in the open market is commonly referred to as the market 
value. Market value as compensation norm is based on the assumption that in the 
property market there will always be a free interchange between supply and 
demand.28 This is problematic when it comes to the (real) property market that is 
                                        
23  South African Land Policy White Paper (1997). 
24  See discussion that follows. 
25  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1580. 
26  Section 12(1) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 sets out how compensation should be 
calculated: 12. Basis on which compensation is to be determined.- (1) The amount of 
compensation to be paid in terms of this act to an owner in respect of property expropriated in 
terms of this act, or in respect of the taking, in terms of this act, of a right to use property, shall 
not, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), exceed- (a) in the case of any property other 
than a right, excepting a registered right to minerals, the aggregate of- (i) the amount which the 
property would have realized if sold on the date of notice in the open market by a willing seller 
to a willing buyer; and (ii) an amount to make good any actual financial loss caused by the 
expropriation; and (b) in the case of a right, excepting a registered right to minerals, an amount 
to make good any actual financial loss caused by the expropriation or the taking of the right: 
Provided that where the property expropriated is of such nature that there is no open market 
therefore, compensation therefore may be determined- (aa) on the basis of the amount it would 
cost to replace the improvements on the property expropriated, having regard to the 
depreciation thereof for any reason, as determined on the date of notice; or (bb) in any other 
suitable manner. 
27  Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
28  In this instance, an open market must be imagined to be a place where a transaction takes place 
free of competition. Penny 1966 SALJ 204 writes that "[t]he 'market' or 'exchange' value of a 
thing is determined by its utility, its scarcity and the competitive wants of purchasers. It 
represents the point of equilibrium between supply and demand at any one moment. In real 
estate valuation, the thing to be valued is the group of rights attaching to a property. Because 
the term "Property" is commonly used as a convenient ellipsis for this group of rights, it should 
not be thought that it is the property as such which is being valued." See Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 
3. For case law, see Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & K Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) 
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regulated by its own occurrences and acts.29 The rationale remains that the market 
price will be determined by the economic principles of supply and demand,30 thereby 
determining the "equivalent in value ... of the property loss" as the Estate Marks v 
Pretoria City Council 31 requires. This method of calculation was adopted in South 
African case law.32 
 
Notwithstanding the problems with this approach,33 the courts have usually found a 
way to apply the open market test, even where it has been very difficult to do so.34 
The market value test plays a central role in South African expropriation law, and in 
order to determine the market value, one has to hypothesise what the property 
would have realised if sold on an open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer. 
 
When the government therefore talks about the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle, 
it refers to open-market transactions based on contract. When one talks about the 
                                                                                                                          
Bpk 1973 3 SA 376 (A) 389; Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (AD) 881-882; 
Estate Hemraj Mooljee v Seedat 1945 NPD 22 24. 
29  Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 8. 
30  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 174. 
31  Estate Marks v Pretoria City Council 1969 3 SA 227 (A) 242. In this case the court, referring to 
market value, imported the common law position that a person whose property is expropriated 
must be compensated in full. According to this approach, compensation is usually paid for the 
value of the property lost, and value is normally taken to be market value. See also 
Pietermaritzburg Corporation v South African Breweries Ltd 1911 AD 501 522 where De Villiers 
JP was "of the opinion [that] we must take the word 'value' in its more ordinary meaning of 
temporary or market value [it being value in exchange]. To give the other meaning [namely 
value in use] would perhaps be more satisfactory from an assessment point of view; in a country 
where fluctuation in the market value of property, are considerable and frequent this would 
certainly make for uniformity". This is a conservative approach according to Grütter Regsposisie 
van die Huurder 56. 
32  See for instance Krause v SA Railways and Harbours 1948 4 SA 554 (O) 560; Hirschman v 
Minister of Agriculture 1972 2 SA 887 (A) 889; Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & K Trust & 
Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1973 ) SA 376 (A) 385; Held v Administrateur-Generaal vir 
die Gebied van Suidwes-Afrika 1988 2 SA 218 (SWA) 225. See also Sri Raja Vyricherla v Revenue 
Divisional Officer Vizagapatam 1939 2 All ER 317 321 for an English law discussion of market 
value. This corresponds with the methods followed in Minister of Water Affairs v Mostert 1966 4 
SA 690 (A) 722; Katzoff v Glaser 1948 4 SA 630 (T) 637. 
33  See below. 
34  Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (AD) 881-882; May v Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe; Thomas Family v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Cairns Family Trust v Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe; Frogmore Tobacco Estates (PVT) Ltd v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 1985 4 SA 185 
(ZH) 116; Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1979 1 SA 949 
(W) 953; Minister of Agriculture v Estate Randeree 1979 1 SA 145 (A) 183. 
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willing-buyer-willing-seller approach with regard to compensation for expropriation, 
it refers to one (of many) methods to determine market value. 
 
2.1 The problem with the market value principle 
 
There seems to be general consensus that the willing-buyer-willing-seller model to 
acquire land for land reform purposes has failed.35 There are various reasons for 
this. Most notable is the long time it takes to acquire land (from the negotiation 
phase to the actual transfer). Firstly, good quality land is sold in the open market - 
either by public auction or private transaction, with relatively expedient transfer of 
ownership.36 This makes it almost impossible for land reform beneficiaries who rely 
on funding to purchase farms, as the funding application takes longer than a normal 
transfer.37 
 
Secondly, the beneficiaries are not directly involved in this process, and must rely on 
the Department of Land Reform (as it was) to do the negotiation on their behalf. 
This means that even if there are small differences in price that a willing buyer might 
have negotiated around, the deal might fall through because the officials do not 
negotiate as a willing buyer would.38 From the seller's side there also seems to be 
delays in payment once the agreement has been reached. This, amongst other 
things, creates the perception that the Department is an unreliable negotiation 
partner.39 This bureaucratic obstacle to purchasing land means that the land 
                                        
35  Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 www.pmg.org.za. 
36  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1585. 
37  The official grant application process requires a written agreement to sell from the landowner 
and an agreement from an independent valuator that the price is market related. This can take 
up to two years, with the risk of the funding application being turned down. Understandably, 
only farmers that are very committed to land reform would enter into a land reform transaction. 
This also means that the farmers that do enter into negotiations for selling land for land reform 
purposes, have a relatively strong negotiation position as there are not many farms in the 
market for this purpose. If the valuers (working for the Department of Land Affairs) estimate a 
price that is below the perceived market value, they can only make such an offer to the farmer, 
who is then free to reject such an estimate. See Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1585. 
38  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1586. 
39  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1586. 
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purchased and transferred to beneficiaries is often of poor quality and very 
expensive. Without a credible threat of expropriation, the status quo will continue.40 
 
2.2 The problem with market value and the willing-buyer-willing-seller 
method of determining market value when calculating 
compensation 
 
Market value is a problematic concept because in transactions of sale, the market is 
a relatively unrestrained phenomenon where sellers and buyers bargain until they 
reach an acceptable price level, and such bargaining is usually done without many 
artificial constraints. The problem thus lies in the fact that one must imagine 
compensating a compulsory purchase in terms of exactly the opposite, namely a free 
market transaction where the price level is determined by the relatively free will of 
the buyer and the seller. The determination of market value is therefore an informed 
guess.41 The method is described as illusory, since the bargaining process is 
constrained by a compulsory sale, and the seller is more often than not unwilling to 
sell.42  
 
As King J stated in Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City 
Council:43 
 
Notwithstanding, the law enjoins me to transport myself into a world of fiction and 
to don the mantle of a super valuator, overriding, if necessary, the views expressed 
by men experienced in the valuation of property and whose views are relied upon 
almost daily by willing purchasers and sellers. I must at one and the same time be 
the willing seller and the willing buyer, both well-informed, and I must arrive at a 
price in a market that did not exist at the time of expropriation. This is so because I 
                                        
40  One of the reasons why land reform failed is that the farms are too big to make it suitable for 
new entrants to the agricultural sector. Farmers seem to be hesitant to sell off only small 
portions of land, and there seems to be resistance against the Subdivision of Agricultural Land 
Act 70 of 1970; coupled with unrealistic commercial business plans and poor post-settlement 
support, beneficiaries have little chance of success. See Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1577. 
41  Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & K Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1973 3 SA 376 
(A); Minister of Lands and Natural Resources v Moresby-White 1978 ) SA 898 (RAD); Krause v 
SA Railways & Harbours 1948 4 SA 554 (O). 
42  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 61. 
43  Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1979 1 SA 949 (W) 955-956. 
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must ignore any enhancement or diminution in value flowing from the expropriation 
or the scheme causing the expropriation. It is an Alice in Wonderland world in 
which the consideration of principles of valuation and the opinions expressed by 
experienced property valuators make the task of the super valuator seemingly 
'curiouser and curiouser'. 
 
The court in Todd v Administrator, Transvaal44 ruled that despite the fact that there 
was no open market, it will nonetheless determine what such property would fetch 
on the open market, since the Expropriation Act requires it.45 It took value to be the 
value that the arbitrator placed on it. This is a clear indication of how the courts 
labour the idea that value can only refer to market value.46 
 
It is unclear which persons would qualify as hypothetical buyers, because different 
buyers will pay different prices for land, based on their needs.47 It is therefore 
assumed that the hypothetical buyer should at least be someone who would in 
practice buy or have bought similar properties.48 This must be done without regard 
to the particular seller, since no method of calculation should include subjective 
considerations.49 
                                        
44  Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (AD) 881-882. 
45  See also May v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Thomas Family v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Cairns 
Family Trust v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Frogmore Tobacco Estates (PVT) Ltd v Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe 1985 4 SA 185 (ZH) 116; Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg 
City Council 1979 1 SA 949 (W) 953. 
46  Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 5 criticises this as being unscientific. 
47  Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 3 says such an imaginary sale is one where the seller is not anxious to 
sell property, but is willing to sell if (s)he gets a good price. It is important that objective 
formulas be used, so that the personal circumstances of the expropriatee do not dictate the 
price. See also Pienaar v Minister van Landbou 1972 1 SA 14 (A) 20. If the land has a special 
characteristic that is of value to the specific owner, this must be disregarded. Examples of this in 
case law include where a house was rebuilt to serve the needs for a disabled person. Instead, 
the court must ask what a person in the shoes of the owner would pay to keep the land. See 
Hirschman v Minister of Agriculture 1972 2 SA 887 (A). 
48  Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 4. He also mentions the Canadian and Australian approaches that state 
that in cases where land has a special meaning to the expropriatee, the expropriatee can also be 
regarded as a hypothetical buyer. It must be treated with caution, since in such a case the 
expropriatee cannot be both the willing buyer and the willing seller. The English case of Sri Raja 
Vyricherla v Revenue Divisional Officer Vizagapatam 1939 2 All ER 317 states that the value of 
the property will not be increased because of such special value. In South Africa there seems to 
be an indication that we follow the rule that the special value would not be regarded to some 
extent. 
49  The court in Pienaar v Minister van Landbou 1972 1 SA 14 (A) stated that market value is an 
objective concept that should be determined not by looking at the personal circumstances of the 
owner, but by looking at the property itself. This contradicts the doctrine of subjective rights that 
regards expropriation as the expropriation of rights to an object, as opposed to the object itself. 
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The market-led approach based on the willing-buyer-willing-seller method seems to 
stand in the way of expedient land transfers of land reform purposes.50 Is 
expropriation a viable alternative, and if so, how should compensation be calculated 
for expropriated land? What does the Green Paper have to say about this issue? 
 
3 Green Paper on Land Reform and compensation for expropriation 
 
The Green Paper in clause 5 states that one of the challenges and weaknesses (and 
thus the rationale for change) is inter alia "the land acquisition strategy / willing-
buyer willing-seller model". It proposes an improved track for land reform51 that will 
attempt to "improve on past and current land reform perspectives, without 
significantly disrupting agricultural production and food security".52 This new track 
will be supported, amongst other things, by the Land Valuer-General. 
 
The Land Valuer-General (LVG) will be a statutory office that will, inter alia, be 
responsible for "determining financial compensation in cases of land expropriation, 
under the Expropriation Act or any other policy and legislation, in compliance with 
the [C]onstitution". Exactly what the powers of the LVG will be or how compensation 
will be calculated is not clear from the Green Paper. The ANC Land Reform Policy 
                                                                                                                          
However, when calculating actual financial loss, personal circumstance can play a role in 
determining how the loss should be compensated. In Durban Corporation v Lewis 1942 NPD 24, 
"value to the owner" was considered "in so far as they enhance the value to him". In Krause v 
SA Railways and Harbours 1948 4 SA 554 (O) 561 "the value which has to be assessed is the 
value to the old owner … not the value to the new owner". In Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & 
K Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1973 3 SA 376 (A) 384 the court stated that value 
is the equivalent in value to the expropriatee. However, the former Appellant Division settled it in 
Pienaar v Minister van Landbou 1972 1 SA 14 (A) 20 where value was determined with reference 
to the land itself, and the court ruled that personal circumstances of the owner should not have 
an influence, since it will be valued differently in the hands of different owners. This point was 
qualified when it was mentioned, but not decided, in Hirschman v Minister of Agriculture 1972 2 
SA 887 (A). Where property has a special value because the owner can use it together with 
other property, it is a factor that will be considered with the calculation of compensation. In such 
a case the owner is regarded as a potential purchaser, even if it means that (s)he is both the 
hypothetical willing buyer and the willing seller (qua owner). It remains, however, the intrinsic 
value of the property that is valuated. However, courts would rather award extra compensation 
under actual financial loss. See Georgiou Determination of Compensation 51. 
50  Lahiff 2007 Third World Quarterly 1585. 
51  Clause 6 of the Green Paper on Land Reform (2011). 
52  Clause 6.1(a) of the Green Paper on Land Reform (2011). 
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Discussion Document53 expands a bit more on what is envisioned. According to this 
policy discussion document, the office of the LVG will report to an inter-ministerial 
committee of ministers who have land interests vested in their departments.54 The 
rationale for this "office" is to provide a "hub of property values" that is reliable and 
comprehensive.55 Importantly, this document raises the concern that there is no 
legislative framework to determine when "market value" must be one of the 
variables in calculating compensation, as opposed to it begin the only variable. 
Therefore, one of the functions of this office will be to determine financial 
compensation when expropriating in line with the Constitution and other 
legislation.56 Again, this document does not seem to give clear and specific direction. 
What follows is an attempt to put a possible direction on the table for discussion. 
 
4 Expropriation for land reform purposes 
 
A holistic reading of section 25 makes it clear that expropriation is possible for land 
reform purposes. Section 25(2) states that "[p]roperty may be expropriated only in 
terms of law of general application (a) for public purpose or in public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court". Section 25(4) qualifies this by stating that "for the purposes of 
this section (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, 
and to reforms to bring about equitable access to South Africa's natural resources".57 
Section 25(5)-(9) provides for land reform. 
 
As far as the interpretation techniques are concerned, the Constitutional Court tends 
to follow a purposive interpretation when interpreting the Bill of Rights.58 The 
                                        
53  ANC 2012 www.anc.org.za. 
54  ANC 2012 www.anc.org.za cl 5.3. 
55  ANC 2012 www.anc.org.za.cl 5.3. 
56  ANC 2012 www.anc.org.za.cl 5.3. 
57  For legislation on natural resources that might be relevant in this section, see for instance 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; National Heritage Resources Act 
25 of 1999; National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
58  Brink v Kitshoff 1996 4 SA 197 (CC). 
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tension in section 25 between the protection afforded to existing rights and the 
reformist imperatives makes it a particularly difficult clause to interpret.59 It has 
been said that an interpretation of section 25 rests on three premises. The first 
premise is that all constitutional property clauses have this inherent tension between 
the protection of existing rights and the state's power to infringe on it. In this 
regard, the land reform provisions in section 25(5)-(9) only add a context-specific 
dimension to the idea that the state has the power to infringe on existing property 
rights.60 Secondly, the power to infringe on private property for the purposes of land 
reform developed from a specific historical context in South Africa. This historical 
context can therefore not be divorced from a proper interpretation of the property 
clause when the state limits private property.61 Thirdly, the fact that the property 
clause is transformative does not imply that the Constitution does not value existing 
private property. It means that the classic protection of private property stands 
alongside the transformative purpose.62 In the context of expropriation these 
premises will be especially important to keep in mind when applying and interpreting 
the property clause. These premises must at least be considered in every 
expropriation case. 
 
Expropriation can be used in all three the pillars of land reform. The redistribution 
pillar of land reform aims to provide landless people with land through assistance 
from the government, mainly through programs that provide inter alia for financial 
assistance through grants and subsidies. Land for redistribution purposes can be 
acquired through expropriation.63 Restitution is managed by the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 2 of 1994.64 It might be necessary for the state, in the instances where 
                                        
59  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 23. 
60  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 23. 
61  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 23. 
62  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 23. 
63  Section 25 of the Constitution; ss 10, 10A and 14 of Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 
1993; ch II of Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
64  Restitution refers to those instances where individuals or communities that were deprived of 
their land under the apartheid laws can claim that their land rights be either restored or replaced 
by other equitable redress (usually monetary compensation). The requirements for restitution 
are set out in s 2 of the Act, and restitution is available to a person or community that was 
dispossessed of their land after June 1913 as a result of a past racially discriminatory law or 
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the claimants claim their land back, to expropriate land in order to restore it to the 
previous owner.65 To a limited extent expropriation might also be relevant in the 
tenure pillar of land reform. Section 25(6) aims at securing tenure of land that has 
been made insecure in the past by racially discriminating laws or practices. In the 
case of tenure reform, land is not redistributed as such, but rights and interests in 
land are strengthened through reform of the applicable laws.66 The beneficiaries of 
the tenure programme are those people who already have interests or rights in land, 
but whose interests or rights are weak. It follows that they do not require land 
through restitution or redistribution, but that their rights are legally redefined and 
thereby strengthened.67 There are various laws aimed at strengthening these 
rights.68 
                                                                                                                          
practices for which just and equitable compensation was not paid. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and 
Mostert Law of Property 629. 
65  This is what essentially happened in Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v 
Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 (LCC); Hermanus v Department of Land Affairs: In 
Re Erven 3535 and 3536, Goodwood 2001 1 SA 1030 (LCC). 
66  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 308-309. 
67  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 309. The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
was promulgated to broaden access to land and to provide security for labour tenants who in the 
past have been denied access to land. As opposed to farm workers, their primary reason for 
staying on the farm is not to earn a salary. These people are protected from arbitrary eviction 
and they can only be evicted in terms of the procedure described in the Act. 
68  The Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 aims at providing communities with secure 
tenancy of communally held land. The Extension of Security and Tenure Act 62 of 1997, also 
referred to as ESTA, protects lawful occupiers of rural land against eviction. This is one of the 
more controversial and politically motivated land reform Acts. The Act aims to provide rural 
stability by providing rural land occupants with a mechanism through which they can acquire 
land, controlling the relationship between owners and lawful occupiers and protecting such 
lawful occupiers against unfair evictions. The Act is aimed at rural occupiers that has permission 
to reside on the land in question and that is not labour tenants. The aspect of ESTA that is 
particularly interesting in an expropriation context is the issue of family graves. Before it was 
amended, s 6(2)(d4) provided that occupiers had the right to visit and maintain family graves on 
the farms these family member had been buried, but the section was amended in 2001 adding 
the right to bury family members on the farm without consent and in some cases against the will 
of the landowner. This can only be done if it is part of the workers' religious or cultural beliefs 
and if it is an established practice to do so. The first two burial cases, based on the old s 
6(2)(d4), were not decided with reference to expropriation. In Serole v Pienaar 2000 1 SA 328 
(LCC) the owner's property rights were weighed up against the right to a cultural life (burial). 
The court found that such a burial would have a significant effect on the owner's property rights, 
and cannot be condoned unless sanctioned by legislation or agreed upon. See Serole v Pienaar 
2000 1 SA 328 (LCC) paras 16-17. In Nkosi v Bührman 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA), the Supreme Court 
of Appeal ruled that the right to bury outside the municipal jurisdiction can only be obtained with 
permission of the landowner. The right to religion, the court ruled, does not include the right to 
diminish the landowner's property rights. See Nkosi v Bührman 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA) paras 49-
50. For a thorough discussion see Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 633 and for the constitutional 
significance see Du Plessis "South African Constitution" 189. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
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With constitutional permission to expropriate for land reform purposes, the most 
pertinent question that remains is how do we calculate compensation that is in line 
with the Constitution? 
 
5 Compensation for expropriation under the Constitution 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Constitution requires that compensation must be "just and equitable" with 
regard to the relevant factors listed in section 25(3), while the Expropriation Act 
contains detailed provisions of what should be compensated and how such 
compensation must be calculated.69 The Expropriation Act, like other legislation 
dealing with expropriation, is only valid insofar as it is consistent with the 
Constitution.70 The Constitutional Court71 stated that it is the Constitution, and not 
legislation, that provides the principles that are applicable when property is 
expropriated. These are principles that the courts must adhere to, and it requires a 
balancing of the listed factors72 with no specific factor carrying more weight than the 
others.73 
 
Either the compensation can be agreed to by those affected, or it can be decided or 
approved by a court. When there is no agreement, the Constitution provides the 
                                                                                                                          
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, also known as PIE, is applicable to 
unlawful occupiers of land (previously so-called squatters). The Act is aimed at regulating 
eviction and ensuring that eviction of unlawful occupiers is just, equitable and fair. The Act tries 
to counter the injustices of the apartheid style forced evictions that limited, limiting landowners' 
rights to evict occupiers of land without due regard to their personal circumstances. See also Van 
der Walt Constitutional Property Law 315-316; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 
593-651, Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights; Muller Impact of Section 26. 
69  In Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 17 the Constitutional Court ruled that 
compensation should be paid under the correct section of the Expropriation Act. If it is paid 
under the wrong section, it may be unconstitutional. See Badenhorst 1998 De Jure 251-270 for 
an overview of the interaction between the Expropriation Act and the Constitution. 
70  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 269. 
71  In Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 31. 
72  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 33. 
73  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 34. Despite ruling that market value is 
but one of five factors, the court applied the Highlands test, which places market value central in 
the determination of compensation (para 37). 
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court with the principles in section 25(3) that should be used when calculating 
compensation.74 The central principle is that the amount of compensation must 
reflect an equitable balance between the public interest of the community and the 
individual interests of the private landowner(s). This balance must be established 
with reference to the relevant circumstances, including, but not restricted to, the list 
of factors in section 25(3). This requires looking at each case individually with regard 
to the individual property interest that might stem from the pre-constitutional era, 
and the constitutional framework and its legitimate land reform efforts. A decision on 
what is just and equitable cannot be made in the abstract without due regard for the 
context of the expropriation. When determining compensation, the broader scheme 
of the Constitution should therefore by duly regarded.75 
 
The aim of compensation under the constitutional dispensation seem to be not to let 
the individual carry the burden on his/her own of something that is in the public 
benefit, as in pre-constitutional expropriation. However, the Constitution aims to do 
this by balancing the interest of the public with the interest of those affected (the 
individual), and this might not always mean paying market value. 
 
The fact that the interest of the individual should be weighed up against the public 
interest means that the centrality of market value in pre-constitutional expropriation 
law should be revised. Market value is only one of the factors that should be 
considered, and must therefore be considered alongside other factors. 76 The weight 
that each factor carries would be determined by the facts and the circumstances of 
each case. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that the Expropriation Act is 
interpreted in line with the Constitution, with special caution not to over-emphasise 
market value. 
 
                                        
74  Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 272. 
75  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 272. 
76  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 273. 
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5.2 Market value 
 
Where market value plays a central role in the calculation of compensation according 
to section 12 of the Expropriation Act, market value is listed as just one factor 
amongst many to be taken into account when determining constitutional 
compensation under section 25(3)(c). Before the Constitution was enacted, 
Claassens77 warned that entrenching a property clause that provides for 
compensation at market value would fuel the tension by protecting existing strong, 
white land rights at the expense of weak, black land rights. White people who 
acquired land relatively inexpensively from black people or the state during apartheid 
will be able to rely on their right to market value compensation. That, in turn, will 
make land reform expensive, if not unaffordable. If the government cannot pay the 
bill for land reform, it means that the dispossessed would not receive equitable 
redress as section 25 requires. It was therefore imperative that the constitutional 
property clause would also include factors other than market value to ensure that 
land reform is just and equitable in the sense of affordable and possible.78 This was 
done by agreeing on four other factors that should be taken into account when 
calculating compensation,79 as well as including the land reform objectives in section 
25.80 
 
In City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd81 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal ruled that compensation for expropriation is a constitutional issue by virtue 
of section 25 of the Constitution. This implies that compensation must be paid in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights. This requires a balancing of interests to determine 
just and equitable compensation. The court focused on market value, since it is the 
only quantifiable value. Market value thus remains pivotal when determining 
compensation. 
 
                                        
77  Claassens 1993 SAJHR 422. 
78  Claassens 1993 SAJHR 423. 
79  Section 25(3) of the Constitution. This is not an exhaustive list. 
80  Section 25(5)-(9) of the Constitution. 
81  City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 1 (SCA) para 19. 
E DU PLESSIS                                                                     PER / PELJ 2014(17)2 
 
 
813 
The Constitutional Court ruled in Du Toit v Minister van Transport82 that 
compensation may not exceed market value,83 it must simply be just and equitable, 
meaning that the individual may not benefit unduly at the expense of the public. 
Rather, the expropriatee must be put in the same position (s)he would have been, 
but for the expropriation.84 In the Helderberg case,85 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
said that compensation cannot be more than market value, since an owner may not 
be better or worse off because of the expropriation. Rather, a monetary award must 
restore the status quo ante. In Khumalo86 the Land Claims Court stated that 
compensation is paid to ensure that the expropriatee is justly and equitably 
compensated for his loss. In Hermanus87 the Land Claims Court also ruled that the 
expropriatee is compensated for the loss of the property, and that the value the 
property has for the owner should be calculated under actual financial loss. The 
court further ruled that it is in the interests of justice that the injuriously affected be 
compensated. 
 
Gildenhuys88 is of the opinion that it should be possible to pay more than market 
value compensation, as the Constitution merely sets the minimum standard that 
must be adhered to. This should be approached with caution, since the balancing of 
interests in section 25(3) requires that the state should not pay more than is due as 
this will have a negative effect on taxpayers.89 Chaskalson and Lewis90 argue that 
such a balancing test might allow for compensation that is more than market value 
in instances where the property, due to particular circumstances, has a value to the 
owner that is more than market value. Thus, balancing out the benefit to the state 
with the affected owner might require the state to pay more.91 Gildenhuys J ruled in 
                                        
82  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 21. 
83  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 21. 
84  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 22. 
85  City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 1 (SCA) para 21. 
86  Khumalo v Potgieter 2000 2 All SA 456 (LCC) para 22. 
87  Hermanus v Department of Land Affairs: In Re Erven 3535 and 3536, Goodwood 2001 1 SA 
1030 (LCC) para 15. 
88  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 164-165. 
89  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 165. 
90  Chaskalson and Lewis 31-24. 
91  See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 556. 
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Ex Parte Former Highlands Residents92 that the interest of the expropriatee requires 
full indemnity when expropriated, and therefore it is possible to pay more than 
market value. 
 
Nhlabathi v Fick93 paved the way for expropriation without compensation in certain 
circumstances, when it ruled that where the infringement is minimal to the owner's 
rights, it should not be necessary to pay full market value compensation, or in this 
case any compensation. This would probably be more likely in land reform instances. 
                                        
92  Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
(LCC) para 34-35. 
93  Nhlabathi v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC) paras 32-35. In Nhlabathi, a widow tried to bury her 
husband in a family graveyard (according to an established custom), but the owner, Mr Fick, 
refused. Ms Nhlabathi went ahead with the arrangements to bury her husband. Nonetheless, 
upon return to the farm she found that the owner locked her out of the property. This prompted 
Ms Nhlabathi to apply for an interdict to allow her to bury Mr Nhlabathi. This interdict was based 
on s 6(2)(dA) of ESTA that allows burial of family members against the will and without 
permission from the landowner, if they were occupiers of land at the time of death and if there 
was an established practice on the farm. The amendment therefore added the right to bury a 
family member to the occupier's tenure right. This right, the court highlighted, is not absolute, 
and must be balanced with the rights of the owner, and is only enforceable if there is an 
established practice on the farm to bury members. The owner argued that s 6(2)(dA) is 
unconstitutional because it does not protect his property. The court, following the First National 
Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (CCT19/01) 2002 ZACC 5 
methodology, ruled that s 6(2)(dA) is a deprivation in terms of law of general application (ESTA). 
The court also found that it is not arbitrary deprivation because the right has to be balanced 
against the right of the landowner, in light of the fact that the section is enacted as part of the 
state's constitutional duties to provide security of tenure. On balancing the right the court found 
that there must be an established practice on the part of the occupier before they can bury the 
family members, and that such an intrusion is minor. The court then had to decide whether the 
burial right is an expropriation. In Serole v Pienaar 2000 1 SA 328 (LCC) the court had stated 
that the right to establish a grave could amount to a servitude, and when such a servitude is 
granted without consent of the owner, it could amount to an expropriation. In Nhlabathi the 
court assumed, without deciding the point, that it could be a de facto servitude, and therefore an 
expropriation. The court then ruled "[t]here can be circumstances where the absence of a right 
to compensation on expropriation is reasonable and justifiable, and in the public interest (which 
includes the nation's commitment to land reform)". This was justifiable under s 36 of the 
Constitution, which the court found to run cumulatively with the ss 25(2) and (3) limitations. The 
court held that the interference with the landowner's property rights is reasonable and justifiable 
as per s 36 because (a) the right does not constitute a major intrusion on the landowner's 
property rights; (b) the right is subject to balancing with the rights of the landowner, whose 
right can sometimes weigh more; (c) the right only exists where there is a past practice of 
burials on the land, and that granting the right will provide the occupiers with security of tenure 
in the land since it will enable them to comply with their religious and cultural beliefs; and (d) it 
will enable the occupiers to comply with their cultural and religious beliefs, since they need to be 
close to their ancestors. The court found that, even if it amounts to expropriation of the property 
in order to use it for burial purposes, it does not require compensation. This is because the 
intrusion to the owner's property, weighed up against the gains for the occupants, is a minor 
intrusion. Alternatively, the absence of compensation could be justified in terms of s 36. 
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The Land Claims Court argued, in line with FNB,94 that the right to bury family in a 
family grave does deprive the owner of his land, and could be an expropriation, but 
that compensation needs not be paid. 
 
While verdict is still open on the question whether the Constitution sets a minimum 
or a maximum standard, what is clear is that compensation must be just and 
equitable, taking into account the five factors in section 25(3). The Constitution 
brought a new requirement, namely that compensation must be "just and equitable" 
by considering and weighing up a non-exhaustive list of factors to take into account. 
Market value is only one of five factors listed, and therefore market value should not 
be the centre of the inquiry into compensation. Nhlabathi, in this context, serves as 
a good example of how the weighing up process works, and how compensation 
needs not always be market value. 
 
5.3 The list in section 25(3) 
 
The Constitution provides us with a non-exhaustive list of factors to take into 
account when determining just and equitable compensation. The first factor in 
section 25(3)(a) provides that the current use of the property can be a relevant 
circumstance that can influence the compensation amount. This subsection seems to 
justify cases where scarce resources, like agricultural land, might be expropriated for 
land reform because it is not otherwise used productively and can be used for 
housing or the establishment of new farmers. For example: where labour tenants 
apply to become owners of land95 it should be borne in mind that the owner did not 
have use of the land.96 It might be possible, therefore, that the owner's loss is not 
substantial. This might mean that the owner should not necessarily receive the full 
market value of the property. This factor cannot be used as a punitive measure as 
that would be against the public purpose.97 It remains a balancing test, where the 
                                        
94  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
95  Section 1 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. 
96  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-59. 
97  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 274. 
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interest of those affected is weighed up with the public interest. The use of the 
property could also be applicable in Modderklip98-type cases: when land is occupied 
unlawfully and the market value is depressed because of it, the court could adjust 
compensation upwards to equalize the negative effect of the unlawful occupation.99 
 
It is not only the current use of the property, but also the history of the acquisition 
of the property that can influence the compensation amount. Section 25(3)(b) 
includes cases where the state expropriated property and sold it well below market 
value during apartheid.100 In many of these cases the state made land available to 
white farmers well below market value.101 If such an owner is now expropriated for 
land reform purposes, it would be unfair to offer full market value compensation. 
Such an owner should not be allowed to benefit twice from apartheid.102 
 
Section 25(3)(c) lists market value as a factor to take into account when calculating 
just and equitable compensation. Market value in section 25(3)(c) probably has the 
same meaning as market value in section 12 of the Expropriation Act,103 although 
market value is not the main consideration in section 25(3). 
 
Section 25(3)(d) refers to the instances where the acquisition by the person 
expropriated and the capital improvement made to such property was made to the 
land with the assistance of the (apartheid) state.104 The rationale underlying this 
subsection is that the (current) state should not compensate an owner for 
                                        
98  President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal 
Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). 
99  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-60. 
100  Du Plessis and Olivier 1997 BPLD 11. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 275. 
101  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-59. See n 106 for an example. 
102  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-59. The question is whether, when an 
owner that benefited from a reduced price transfer the land to a bona fide third party, the 
history of acquiring factor is still applicable. The general feeling is that such a buyer should not 
be penalised because of the initial history of acquisition. It is also not sure whether the fact that 
farms were inherited or often sold symbolically to transfer the property to a child before death, 
for example, should be taken into account. See Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 172 for a detailed 
explanation of how compensation will be calculated in such cases. See also Badenhorst 1998 De 
Jure 261. 
103  See Badenhorst 1998 De Jure 262 
104  This only applies to direct subsidies in respect to the property. 
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improvements that they made with (apartheid) state subsidies, as it will not be just 
and equitable to do so.105 Budlender is of the opinion that it is only direct subsidies 
that should be taken into account.106 
 
Section 25(3)(e) requires the court to have regard for the purpose of the 
expropriation.107 It is not clear whether this means that if land is expropriated for 
land reform purposes the owner should be happy to accept a lower price than where 
property is expropriated for non-land reform public purposes,108 or whether it merely 
confirms the reformist agenda of section 25.109 Badenhorst110 states that it is 
possible that in cases where expropriation is for land reform purposes, compensation 
can be less than market value. It is, however, important not to interpret this section 
too widely to include non-land reform purposes.111 In the Du Toit trilogy112 the court 
                                        
105  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 276. An apt example would be the case of the 
Mfengu people that used to reside in the Tsitsikamma area. Their land was registered in the 
1840s under a Moravian Mission's name. The land was later on scheduled for occupation by 
"natives" under the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913. These people were finally removed from 
Keiskammahoek in 1977 on the State President's order. They were moved to the old homeland 
of Ciskei. The apartheid state promised them compensation that they never received. They were 
given land in Ciskei, but it was substantially smaller and drier than the land in Tsitsikamma. The 
Tsitsikamma land were allocated to other people or sold to white buyers at a third of the price 
with a government bond covering the whole amount. In 1990, lawyers and activists became 
aware that many farmers intended to sell the land for great profits. The land was returned in 
1994, before the elections, when Archbishop Tutu initiated a land claim on behalf of the people 
to the then Minister of Land Affairs and then President FW de Klerk. In terms of the settlement, 
the farmers were paid an amount of R35 million, while the trust that took ownership of the land 
got a R1,96 million award. See Everingham and Janneke 200) Journal of Southern African 
Studies 554; Claassens 1993 SAJHR 424. Such a discount, as well as the subsidy, should thus be 
taken into account when farmers who acquired their farms in such a way, is expropriated for 
land reform purposes. 
106  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-65. 
107  The purpose of the expropriation in s 25(3)(e) is complimented by s 25(4)(a), which states that 
public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform. S 25(4)(a) therefore 
circumscribes the content of public interest, while s 25(3)(e) is about the role that public purpose 
plays in compensation. This should also be distinguished from s 25(2)(a), which states that the 
expropriation must be in the public interest or for a public purpose, therefore public interest and 
public purpose as requirements for the expropriation. 
108  For Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 178 this interpretation would not be just. 
109  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 276 where he explains that s 25(3)(e) probably aims at 
avoiding frustrating expropriations aimed at social necessities. If s 25(3)(e) is read in conjunction 
with s 25(8) where the Constitution directs the state to promote land reform, then such an 
interpretation would be plausible, especially in cases where paying compensation would impede 
land reform. 
110  Badenhorst 1998 De Jure 263. 
111  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 276. 
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took into account the purpose of the expropriation even though it was not for land 
reform purposes. This has been questioned.113 
 
Subsections (a)-(e) are not all applicable in all cases, and it might be that in certain 
circumstances a particular subsection is more relevant than others. However, it is 
important that all relevant circumstances be taken into account in every case, 
including those circumstances or factors that might be relevant, but not listed in 
section 25(3). 
 
The courts were left to interpret how these factors interact with one another and in 
Ex Parte Former Highlands Residents114 Gildenhuys J formulated a two-step 
approach when calculating compensation. After discussing foreign law, Gildenhuys J 
concluded that market value plays a central role in other jurisdictions, even in those 
with a property clause in the Constitution.115 Therefore, when calculating 
compensation the courts should first determine the market value of the property 
(since it is easily quantifiable),116 and then, based on the list in section 25(3), adjust 
the amount either upwards or downwards.117 Market value was thus elevated to a 
central or starting position in determining compensation. The Constitutional Court in 
Du Toit,118 relying on Ex parte former Highlands Residents, acknowledged that the 
Constitution provides for considerations other than market value, but restricted the 
influence of the other factors by confirming that one should proceed by first 
                                                                                                                          
112  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2003 1 SA 586 (C); Minister of Transport v Du Toit 2005 1 SA 16 
(SCA); Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC). 
113  See Van der Walt 2005 SAJHR. 
114  Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
(LCC) paras 34-35. 
115  This might not be entirely true. Many jurisdictions acknowledge that compensation need not be 
market value. This is particularly so in Germany, where what is required is an equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. See for example BVerfGE 24, 367 
[1968] (Hamburgisches Deichordnungsgesetz). 
116  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-60 rightly notes that market value is 
preferred because it is seen as "objective", but yet it is difficult to determine the exact market 
value because there are many variables that need to be considered when determining it. 
117  Ex parte former Highland Residents: In Re Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
(LCC) paras 34-35. 
118  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) paras 25-28. 
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determining market value and then adjusting that amount to fit the constitutional 
list.119 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Since starting my doctorate seven years ago, the slow pace of land reform and the 
reluctance of the state to use its expropriation powers to acquire property only 
became more significant. If the aim is to transfer 30% of land by 2014 (in the land 
redistribution plan), something drastic must be done, and most indications are that 
the move must be away from government (only) employing the willing-buyer-willing-
seller model. Confiscation of land (or Zimbabwe-style land grabbing) is not 
constitutionally permissible, but on the continuum between confiscation and contract 
there are various other options. One of them is expropriating property. This might in 
some instances be preferred to an open market transaction, such as where the 
owner seems to ask an unrealistically high price for the property. 
 
The Green Paper is surprisingly quiet on the matter of compensation of 
expropriation, and thus offers little guidance as to how the state will calculate 
compensation for expropriations. It only mentions that the LVG will determine 
compensation, making it clear that it will be in line with the Constitution (and other 
legislation). This is worrisome, especially in light of the importance of compensation, 
should the government wish to abandon the willing-buyer-willing-seller model. What 
this paper argues is that there is no need for a radically new legal framework for 
expropriation, since the Constitution already provides such a framework. 
 
The advent of constitutional democracy and the inclusion of a property clause in the 
Bill Rights should have brought a new dimension to South African property law. A 
                                        
119  See also Khumalo v Potgieter 2000 2 All SA 456 (LCC), where the court had to determine what is 
just and equitable compensation for property expropriated under the Land Reform (Land 
Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. The court ruled that the determination of compensation is a two-stage 
process. Firstly, the court had to determine the market value of the property with established 
methods of valuation (read market value), where after the state must consider how market value 
should be adjusted according to the principles laid down in s 25(3). 
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result of negotiations, section 25 is characterised by a tension between the existing 
(mainly white) secure property rights and the need for transformation in order to 
secure or create property rights for those who have weak or non-existent (mainly 
black) property interests. Section 25(2) and (3) especially provides the state with the 
power to interfere with existing property rights by warranting expropriation if certain 
requirements are met. Read with section 25(4), the suggestion is that in the land 
reform context even greater government interference with existing private property 
rights are warranted in order to meet the transformative goals of the Constitution. 
 
Market value still plays a central role in the calculation of compensation. Market 
value is the starting point of the calculation of compensation, where after the 
remaining factors in section 25(3) are utilised to adjust the compensation amount 
upwards or downwards. The problem with such an approach is that if the owner of 
expropriated property is always compensated at market value the aims of land 
reform, as instructed by section 25 of the Constitution, might be just too expensive 
to reach. The factors in section 25(3) seem to be specifically aimed at making land 
reform affordable. Thus, in order to adhere to both sides of section 25 of the 
Constitution, a new method of interpreting expropriation legislation needs to be 
considered, where the focus is on just and equitable compensation and not just on 
market value. 
 
The bigger questions that remain unanswered are when "constitutional 
compensation" should be paid, and how it should be calculated. The Constitution is 
the supreme law of the land, and all legislation and administrative acts should be in 
accordance with the Constitution. Before the Constitution, compensation was paid 
because it was presumed that the state will not take away rights without 
compensation, unless clearly stated. The Constitution requires that the interests of 
the individual be weighed against the interests of the public, and this means that the 
focus shifted to the individual holding property rights in the context of society. 
Before the Constitution, compensation was deemed to be market value. Under the 
Constitution, compensation must be "just and equitable", an amount necessary to 
E DU PLESSIS                                                                     PER / PELJ 2014(17)2 
 
 
821 
alleviate the burden from the individual in proportion to the gain of the public, 
presumably also due to the balancing required. 
 
Courts need to be aware of what they are protecting when they order the payment 
of compensation. Not only does this require placing the individual's right to property 
in a social context, but also that courts situate the compensation question in the 
broader historical context and applies a proportionality test to ensure fairness. This 
will shift the emphasis away from market value and enable a transformative 
approach to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions on 
expropriation. An individual would not be required to unfairly shoulder the burden of 
expropriation, but society will likewise not be held accountable for compensation at 
full market value in the instances where it is not justified. 
 
The pre-constitutional legal culture, still present in constitutional expropriation law, 
should change. The courts should ask themselves whether a pre-constitutional 
interpretation of the law they have to apply is still tenable in the new constitutional 
dispensation. Only if the courts grapple with this question can new, transformative 
expropriation law be developed through precedent. This may open a door to move 
away from the strict market-value centred and "scientific" legal culture of 
expropriation towards a transformative, constitutional and legal culture of 
expropriation. A new body of context- and history-sensitive case law, treating each 
case individually and situating it in its proper context, might ensue in time. This will 
also aid in the project of transformative constitutionalism to bring about "large-scale 
social change through non-violent political processes, grounded in law. If the courts 
do not start to develop such a new body of case law, we will be left with a 
compensation for expropriation legal culture, making the future of expropriation law 
"curiouser and curiouser". 
 
This can be achieved either through the courts120 re-interpreting expropriation 
legislation when they are called upon for adjudicating on expropriation matters, or 
                                        
120  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150. 
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by the legislature that should give clear guidelines on how "just and equitable" 
compensation should be paid. The Green Paper does not provide for this. 
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